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a b s t r a c t
Can norms of distributive fairness serve as pillars of a new and more effective global climate
regime? Three general principles – responsibilities, capabilities (capacity), and needs (or
rights) – are frequently invoked and rarely disputed. Yet, parties’ interpretations often
diverge, reflecting conflicts of interests. To determine how much is at stake, we compare – by
means of a global integrated assessment model (GRACE) – 15 legitimate interpretations of
‘responsibilities’ and ‘capabilities’ in terms of their implications for the mitigation obliga-
tions and costs of seven potentially pivotal actors. Most of these interpretations yield similar
results for most actors. In a scenario where global emissions in 2030 are reduced by 20%
compared to a business-as-usual baseline, mitigation costs vary by less than 1% of GDP for
the United States, the European Union, Japan, India, and China. For Brazil and Russia,
however, variance is much larger. Moreover, for all actors, mitigation costs rise steeply as
ambition levels increase. Under such circumstances, searching for a single ‘fairness-opti-
mizing’ formula is likely to fail. As negotiators explore systems of voluntary pledges, a more
promising approach would conceive of fairness as a multidimensional construct and foster
accommodation through mutual recognition of a limited range of legitimate norm inter-
pretations.
# 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Can norms of distributive fairness serve as pillars of a new and
more effective global climate change regime? A positive
answer requires that at least two conditions be met. First, a
small set of compatible fairness principles and operational
interpretations of these principles must be accepted as valid
and relevant by a critical minimum of participating states.
Second, these principles and interpretations must in fact serve
as important premises for these states’ policies and positions.* Corresponding author at: University of Oslo, Department of Political
Tel.: +47 22855241.
E-mail address: arild.underdal@stv.uio.no (A. Underdal).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.03.009
1462-9011/# 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is 
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).conditions are easy to find. Climate change mitigation
combines several features that make it an extremely demand-
ing governance challenge (Levin et al., 2012; Verweij et al.,
2006; Victor, 2011). For many countries, large cuts in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are called for, requiring
radical changes in important policies and practices. Very long
time lags, many extending well beyond one human genera-
tion, exist between mitigation measures (involving more or
less predictable costs for specific groups) and effects (in the
form of more uncertain benefits for the world). Such time lags Science, P.O. Box 1097, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
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holders disenfranchised and future benefits underrepresent-
ed. Stark asymmetries between rich (polluters) and poor
(victims) generate severe conflicts of interest and ‘dampen
cooperative efforts’ (Parks and Roberts, 2008, p. 621). In
addition, strong competition in world markets and interna-
tional politics tends to reinforce parties’ concerns with relative
gains and losses. Under such conditions, orchestrating
effective cooperation would be a tall order for any intergov-
ernmental organization. For the negotiations under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
– an institution combining universal participation with a very
demanding decision rule (consensus) and a distribution of
implementation power that tilts in favour of the major
emitters – the challenge seems overwhelming.
One important implication of this sombre assessment is
that searching for a common and precise formula that
policymakers and diplomats can use to ‘derive’ a fair
distribution of obligations and rights is not likely to succeed.
In fact, intensive search for a single authoritative ‘fairness-
optimizing’ formula may well increase the risk of deadlock
(Bretschger, 2013; Parks and Roberts, 2008; Victor, 2011). Part of
the explanation can be found in global conference diplomacy
itself. Plenary sessions – in particular, those spotlighting
political leaders – provide fertile ground for ideological
posturing and for defending the interests of important
domestic constituencies. Moreover, by establishing semi-
permanent groups, the UN system ‘may actually construct
new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-
based disagreements existing between countries’ (Castro
et al., 2014, p. 109). The risk of such counter-productive effects
will likely increase further if a ‘top-down’ formula approach
were to be pursued at a time when negotiations are turning
towards ‘bottom-up’ pledges of voluntary contributions.
Yet, extant research strongly indicates that fairness
matters, particularly when dealing with stark asymmetries
between rich and poor (Dannenberg et al., 2010; Gampfer,
2014; Lange et al., 2010). The climate change challenge brings
to the forefront profound questions concerning moral respon-
sibility, mitigation and adaptation capacity, and people’s
rights to the global commons and to economic development.
Although often invoked to legitimize and reinforce interest-
based arguments and positions, norms of fairness can also
serve to constrain the pursuit of self-interest and to provide
roadmaps for accommodation (Dannenberg et al., 2010;
Gampfer, 2014; Lange et al., 2010). Some analysts argue that
for an international agreement to be effective it ‘must be
widely perceived as equitable’ (Winkler and Rajamani, 2014, p.
103).
In this paper, we ‘translate’ the UNFCCC principles of
responsibilities and capabilities into 15 allocation schemes
and use a global integrated assessment model (GRACE, see
Appendix) to explore the implications of these schemes for the
mitigation obligations and costs of seven potentially pivotal
actors: United States, European Union, Japan, Russia, Brazil,
China, and India. We begin (Section 2) with briefly reviewing
extant research to identify broadly accepted fairness princi-
ples and legitimate interpretations of these principles for the
global distribution of mitigation obligations. In Section 3, we
apply these interpretations to our seven actors under twoalternative global emission reduction targets. We first explore
the implications of the 15 interpretations for the relative
distribution of mitigation obligations (Section 3.1) and move
on to estimate each actor’s costs of meeting its own
obligations under the two global emission reduction targets
(Section 3.2). In the final section, we explore the implications
of these results for fairness-promoting strategies in the
UNFCCC negotiations. Given the stark asymmetries between
rich and poor and the consensus rule of the UNFCCC
conferences, we argue that the most constructive contribu-
tions to a fair and effective agreement will likely come from
actors who conceive of fairness as a multidimensional
construct, recognize a limited range of norm interpretations
as legitimate, and foster positive reciprocity through coopera-
tive (more precisely, ‘integrative’) behaviour.
2. Fairness principles and operational
interpretations
2.1. Norms and interests
In the research literature, three general observations stand
out. First, even though a bewildering array of fairness criteria
and arguments may seem to exist (see e.g. Klinsky and
Dowlatabadi, 2009, pp. 97–98), the literature shows consider-
able convergence on a small set of basic principles. Second,
parties’ relative priorities and (operational) interpretations of
these principles tend to reflect national circumstances and
material interests (Carlsson et al., 2013; Lange et al., 2010). Not
surprisingly, G77 estimates responsibility retrospectively – in
some instances going back to the Industrial Revolution – while
the United States attaches more importance to recent trends
and likely future trajectories. Where some interpretations
yield significantly higher mitigation costs than others,
material interests will likely trump fairness norms. Third,
the two sets of premises seem to interact synergistically,
meaning (a) that parties tend to favour fairness principles
and interpretations that are compatible with their own
material interests, and (b) that any given principle and
interpretation will likely be more important in reinforcing
the positions of parties that stand to gain from their
application than in modifying the positions of parties that
expect to lose. Combining (a) and (b), we can see that in highly
asymmetrical relationships, broad consensus at the level of
general principles need not facilitate agreement on a specific
deal (Underdal et al., 2012, p. 487). Accordingly, attention to the
operational interpretation of norms is required to understand
what parties can gain or lose.
In this paper, the term ‘fair’ refers to distributions that
combine two key elements: equal treatment of equal cases
(here: equality), and differential treatment of cases that differ
significantly in important respects (here: equity). The latter
requirement is most often translated into a somewhat flexible
notion of proportionality. Sometimes, however, the range of
variance is so wide that even a flexible interpretation of
proportionality would leave the poorest or weakest parties
with burdens they cannot reasonably be expected to shoulder.
In such cases, a more categorical rule of exemption is often
introduced, relieving certain parties (temporarily) of any
Table 1 – Fairness principles and their validity domains.
Fairness principles Validity domains
Equality Relevant differences too small to
be normatively significant
Equity – proportionality Relevant differences normatively
significant but not very large
Equity – exemption Relevant differences very large
Note: Builds on Ringius et al., 2002.
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compensated. One important lesson emerging from this
literature is that to qualify as fair, a climate agreement must
combine notions of equality, proportionality, and exemption, as
indicated in Table 1 (see Ringius et al., 2002).
In climate change negotiation documents and public
statements, at least three interpretations of equity are
frequently invoked and rarely disputed (see e.g. Mattoo and
Subramanian, 2012). These interpretations refer to a party’s
responsibility for causing damage, its capacity to contribute to
problem solving, and its need for (or right to) the goods or
benefits concerned (Table 2). Responsibility is the backbone of
the polluter-pays principle, capacity is the key differential
variable in schemes of progressive taxation, and need is the
most important criterion in social-welfare programmes. The
UNFCCC reference to ‘common but differentiated responsibil-
ities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR&RC), accepted by 195
states, is a fairly succinct expression of this three-pillar
platform. In the climate change literature, no clear ranking has
been established among these criteria, but a widely accepted
interpretation seems to be that insofar as needs (rights) refer
to basic goods or fundamental human rights, the needs (rights)
criterion trumps the others (Mu¨ller and Mahadeva, 2013, p. 8).
A survey targeting respondents directly involved in the
climate change negotiations showed strongest support for
the principles of responsibility (support balance = +69%) and
need (support balance = +57%) (Lange et al., 2007).1
The question here is how alternative interpretations of the
CBDR&RC principles of responsibilities and capabilities would
affect important countries. We address this question first by
exploring how countries’ relative contributions vary with the
exact interpretation of these principles, and second by
estimating the impact of countries’ relative mitigation
contributions on their national welfare, under two global
ambition levels. To render these tasks manageable, the
analysis is limited to seven key actors: Brazil, China, the
European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States.
Together, these actors account for nearly two thirds of world
GHG emissions (including LUCF). Moreover, most are seen as
leaders of larger groups of countries (Karlsson et al., 2011),
indicating that any mitigation agreement signed and ratified
by all seven will likely be accepted by a large majority of other
states as well.
2.2. Interpretations of responsibility
Normative theory distinguishes between an actor’s role in
causing damage and that actor’s moral responsibility (‘guilt’)
for the damage it has caused. A causal role is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for moral responsibility. To assign
moral responsibility, one must in addition prove that an actor
(a) had, or at least could have obtained, effective control over
the harmful activities for which it stands accused, and (b)
knew, or at least could reasonably be expected to have known,
the (risk of) damage caused by these activities (see e.g.1 The support balance is measured as (very high + high sup-
port)  (low + very low support). In the survey, the responsibility
principle was labelled ‘polluter pays’ and the need principle ‘poor
losers’.Aristotle, 350 BCE; Mu¨ller et al., 2009). The control requirement
limits the transferability of guilt across generations.2 The
available knowledge requirement implies that the historical
backlog of moral responsibility cannot go back to the
Industrial Revolution, beginning around 1760. Most of the
research literature seems to agree that there developed
around 1970 a sufficiently solid and well-known scientific
basis for suspecting human activities of being a significant
driver of climate change (Mattoo and Subramanian, 2012, p.
1088); to be on the safe side, some say compelling evidence has
been available ‘at least [. . .] since 1990’ (Parikh and Parikh,
2009, p. 4), the year the first IPCC assessment report was
published.
What may legitimately be traced back to early periods of
technological innovation and economic growth are accumulat-
ed competitive advantages enjoyed also by current generation(s).
Particularly relevant to the climate change negotiations are
persistent advantages and benefits accumulated through
unrestricted use of Earth’s capacity to absorb GHG emissions.
This capacity is a global collective good, overexploited by the
rich North to its own advantage. The world’s poor, many being
innocent victims of climate change, can make a strong case for
equal opportunities or adequate compensation (Baer, 2013).
One way of recognizing the equal-opportunities claim would
be to include competitive advantages accumulated by the rich
North through unrestricted use of global commons as integral
elements of capabilities (implying higher mitigation obligations
for the North) and needs/rights (implying lower mitigation
obligations for the South).
To apply the responsibility principle to climate change
mitigation, further specification is required in at least three
respects. First, which GHGs and human activities should be
included in responsibility assessments (see den Elzen et al.,
2013)? Since the human impact on the climate system is a
function of the weighted aggregate of all GHG emissions
generated by human activities, the default option would be an
equally comprehensive responsibility estimate. Practical
problems of emissions accounting and impact measurement
may, however, lead parties to settle for a less comprehensive
programme. Hence, this analysis considers two notions of
comprehensiveness: CO2 emissions from fossil fuels only and
total emissions of GHGs.
Second, who qualifies for exemption? In the research
literature, the most common approach has been to grant
exemptions to countries whose average income level falls
below a certain (official) poverty line (e.g. Baer, 2013; Mu¨ller
and Mahadeva, 2013). Since even poor countries have rich2 For more or less permanent organizations, such as states, this
limitation may be modified but not dismissed.
Table 2 – Common interpretations of equity.
Focus on Object to be allocated
Costs (obligations) Benefits (rights)
Causes of the problem Responsibility (moral responsibility/‘guilt’ in having
caused the problem)
Previous contributions (to solving the problem)
Consequences of the
solution (efforts)
Capabilities (capacity to contribute to problem solving) Need for (or right to) the goods concerned
Notes: Builds on Ringius et al. (2002). The ‘previous contributions’ argument is the least frequently invoked and therefore not considered here.
‘Need’ is often operationalized as the inverse of GDP per capita, the most common indicator of capabilities, and – as such – included here.
3 Some of the estimates of renewable energy resource endow-
ments do not meet strict standards of comparability, so caution is
required in interpreting the results.
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that the domestic distribution of income or wealth should also
be taken into account (e.g. Rao, 2013). The analysis reported here
applies the following exemption rules: Countries with per
capita CO2 emissions above the world average (here: United
States, European Union, Japan, and Russia) have proportional
responsibility for all their own emissions. Countries emitting
between 50% and 100% of the world average (here: China and
Rest of the World) are proportionally responsible for emissions
within that interval only. Countries emitting <50% of the world
average (here: Brazil and India) are granted full exemption.
Third, for which time horizon should responsibility be
estimated (see Friman and Hjerpe, 2014)? The scope conditions
of control and knowledge limit the backlog of moral guilt but
provide no guidance regarding likely future emission trajec-
tories. What can be said, however, is that dynamic updating
would be required to capture significant changes in countries’
shares of global emissions. For CO2 emissions, four partly
overlapping time horizons are considered (1971–2009, 1990–
2009, 1971–2017, and 1990–2017); for all GHGs, only the 1990–
2010 period is included.
Some recent studies have made a case for replacing
conventional emissions accounting with estimates that also
capture the carbon embodied in international trade (see e.g.
Peters et al., 2012). Other studies have argued that since
responsibilities and capabilities vary substantially within
countries, the appropriate level of analysis would be individ-
uals or households rather than countries (see e.g. Kartha et al.,
2012). Three of our allocation schemes are designed to explore
plausible implications of these arguments for the global
distribution of mitigation obligations.
2.3. Interpretations of capabilities
Strictly speaking, capabilities can be assessed only with
reference to a specific task or function. Thus, some factors
important in boosting mitigation capacity – renewable energy
resource endowments, for example – are less important for
adaptation. Moreover, a country’s contribution to mitigating
GHG emissions may take different forms – from preserving or
establishing sinks to transforming carbon-intensive energy
systems – and the capabilities required will somewhat depend
on the kind of contribution made. Confronted with such
complexity, researchers (and policymakers) have looked for a
simple capabilities concept that can cover a wide range of
tasks and functions. ‘Capacity to pay’ seems to meet this
requirement at least as well as any other equally simple
conceptualization, and GDP per capita has emerged as abroadly accepted indicator for which standardized data are
readily available. Refinements have been suggested, however.
Among these the Oxford Capabilities Measure stands out as a
strong candidate, combining national GDP and GDP per capita
figures with an index of ‘poverty intensity’ (Mu¨ller and
Mahadeva, 2013). Some researchers find the capacity-to-pay
framework too narrow and point to more inclusive multidi-
mensional constructs, in particular the UNDP’s Human
Development Index (Winkler et al., 2013, p. 413). The argument
has merit; some important capability components – renew-
able energy resource endowments being one obvious example
– are not at all represented by the GDP per capita indicator.
Moreover, important tasks, such as de-carbonizing energy
systems, call for capacity to innovate and govern, not merely
capacity to pay.
In response to objections raised against relying on GDP per
capita as the only indicator of relevant capabilities, two more
inclusive indexes are constructed. One, labelled transformation
capacity, is designed to measure countries’ economic and
political abilities to ‘de-carbonize’ energy systems. As defined
here, transformation capacity is a function of (a) the conven-
tional GDP per capita variable (weight .6), (b) innovation capacity
(.2), (c) governance capacity (.1), and (d) transparency (.1). The
other index, labelled renewable energy resource endowments, is a
weighted aggregate of countries’ per capita endowments of
solar (.4), wind (.2), bio (.2), and hydro (.2) energy resources.3
To sum up, we have translated the UNFCCC principles of
responsibilities and capabilities into 15 allocation schemes, of
which 11 are interpretations of responsibilities and four are
interpretations of capabilities. Table 3 provides a brief
overview of these schemes; more information is provided in
the online supplementary material.
2.4. Scenarios for assessment of mitigation costs
To estimate mitigation costs of alternative distributive
schemes we need to specify mitigation targets (ambition
levels). In this analysis, global mitigation targets are deter-
mined on the basis of a business as usual (BAU) scenario by
using a global economic model (GRACE) briefly described in the
Appendix. We construct a BAU scenario, where population
growth follows the 2010 version of the United Nations
projection (UNPD, 2011). The BAU scenario roughly reproduces
the regional GDP growth 2010–2030 as depicted in the New
Table 3 – Two fairness principles and the 15 interpretations examined in our analysis.
Fairness principle Interpretations Operational specifications
Responsibilities Total CO2 emissions from fossil fuels: four interpretations, ref.
to alternative time horizons
Time horizons: 1971–2009; 1990–2009; 1971–
2017; 1990–2017
Per capita emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels: four
interpretations, ref. to alternative time horizons
As above
Total CO2 emissions, including carbon embodied in int. trade:
two interpretations, ref. to alternative time horizons
Time horizons: 1990–2010; 1990–2017
Total emissions of all greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalents):
one interpretation
Time horizon, 1990–2010
Capacities Energy systems’ transformation capacity: one interpretation,
weighted aggregate (index)
Index weights: GDP/capita (.6), innovation
(.2), governance (.1), transparency (.1)
Domestic distribution of individual wealth (adults only): one
interpretation
Index distinguishing four levels of wealth,
weighted 0 (<1000 USD) to 5 (>100,000 USD)
Renewable energy resource endowments per capita: one
interpretation, weighted aggregate (index)
Index weights: Solar (.4), wind (.2), bio (.2),
hydro (.2)
Renewable energy resource endowments per capita + GDP/
capita: one interpretation
Index weights: Renewables/capita (.5), GDP/
capita (.5)
Note: For additional information, see supplementary material, TABLES SM1–5.
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Growth of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels follows total GHG
emissions in the reference scenario of the Climate Action
Tracker (2012) by assuming a constant share of CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels in total GHG emissions. That share is also used
to derive CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in other scenarios.
Besides the BAU scenario, we consider two mitigation
scenarios of the Climate Action Tracker (2012): Scenario 1
representing the ‘More ambitious proposals & national
policies not yet pledged internationally’ and Scenario 2
depicting an ‘Illustrative pathway likely holding warming
below 2 8C’. For both scenarios, we derive global CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels 2010–2030 (Fig. 1a). To achieve global CO2
reductions in 2030 by 20% and 50% of the BAU levels in
Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively (Fig. 1b), we assume a global
carbon market where regional CO2 prices are equalized
through interregional carbon trade. This global market
mechanism moves CO2 prices towards US$60 and US$340
per tonne in Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively (Fig. 1c), reflecting
that marginal costs of CO2 reduction increase markedly along
with tighter mitigation targets. Because the GRACE model
assumes an ideal world in the sense that barriers are absent,
the cost-effective regional ‘real’ emissions (Fig. 1d) can always
be achieved no matter which distributive scheme is selected
(see e.g. Hoel, 1991). In doing so, we isolate the effect of a
distributive scheme on regional mitigation costs.
In this analysis, we use GDP changes compared to BAU to
indicate mitigation costs of the two scenarios and of
alternative distributive schemes.
3. Results and discussion: how much is at
stake?
3.1. Fairness in terms of relative contributions to global
mitigation
Fig. 2 and Table 4 summarize the results regarding relative
contributions to global mitigation efforts. Four patternsemerge as quite robust. First, for all indicators of responsibility
and transformation capacity, rich countries must contribute
much more to mitigating climate change than poor countries
do. Second, the distance between rich and poor countries is
smaller for all capabilities-based indicators (except GDP per
capita) than it is for emissions-based indicators of responsibili-
ty. The difference between these two sets of indicators reflects
technological development and changes in the world economy
over the past three to four decades. Third, overall, responsibili-
ties measured in terms of emissions are not much affected by
the choice of time horizon (Spearman rho = .94**–1.00**) or scope
of comprehensiveness (.86*–.96**). Similarly, within our sample
of actors, all transformation-capacity indicators are strongly
correlated with each other (.71*–.96**) and the aggregate index
itself correlates positively with responsibilities measured as per
capita CO2 emissions (.82*–.86*). The only striking exception to
this pattern is the renewable energy resource endowments
index, which adds a truly different dimension so far ignored in
most capability assessments. Fourth, for all actors except India,
one or two of our indicators deviate significantly from the
prevailing pattern, and for Brazil and Russia differences in
mitigation costs are large.
This analysis leaves us with three important messages.
First, most interpretations examined here yield similar results
for most but not all actors. Some policy implications of
fairness principles seem, in other words, to be broadly
accepted. Second, no single indicator can represent all
legitimate interpretations of the principles of responsibilities
and capabilities. Third, no single dichotomy – such as that
between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, or ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ – can
adequately capture the full range of variance on responsibility
and capability indicators found among the countries partici-
pating in the UNFCCC negotiations.
3.2. Fairness in terms of mitigation costs
Here, three observations stand out. First, marginal mitigation
costs rise steeply for all parties (regions) as overall ambitions
increase (Fig. 3). In Scenario 1, mitigation costs for the
Fig. 1 – Global mitigation scenarios: (a) Global CO2 emissions from fossil combustion, (b) global mitigation targets of CO2
emissions compared to BAU, (c) global CO2 prices, and (d) ‘real’ CO2 reductions in 2030 compared to BAU.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 5 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 – 4 440European Union, the United States, Japan, and China are, for
all principles and operational interpretations, within the range
of 1% of GDP. In Scenario 2, corresponding figures for these
parties are about 10 times higher. This dramatic increase is not
visible in the responsibility- and capability-based estimates of
countries’ relative contributions shown in Fig. 2. The increase
is, however, profoundly important for the climate change
negotiations, making a new global agreement at the Scenario 2
level much harder to reach – and even more so to implement –
than an agreement at the Scenario 1 level would be.
Second, in both scenarios, mitigation costs vary consider-
ably among parties, consistent with patterns found in other
studies (e.g. Mattoo and Subramanian, 2012). Among develop-
ing countries, India benefits under all principles and inter-
pretations, and China benefits from some interpretations but
only in Scenario 2. By contrast, Brazil risks considerable lossesin both scenarios. Substantial differences are found also within
the group of developed countries. In both scenarios, the United
States, the European Union, and Japan suffer only modest losses
compared to Russia, which consistently stands out with the
highest relative mitigation costs of all seven parties. Russia’s
vulnerability is due to its heavy dependence on fossil fuel
extraction. Worth noticing, our analysis indicates that mitiga-
tion costs can vary as much within the groups of ‘developing’
and ‘developed’ countries as between these groups.
Third, in the less ambitious Scenario 1, four parties – China,
India, the European Union, and the United States – are only
moderately affected by the choices examined here among
fairness principles and interpretations. For the other three
parties, mitigation costs vary much more. In our sample, Brazil
provides the most dramatic illustration, with deviations in
GDP ranging from 0.6 to 4.0% of BAU in Scenario 1 and from
Fig. 2 – Regional contributions to global mitigation as percentage of the world total. Note: The numbers above the bars show
the maximum shares and the numbers below show the minimum shares. The discrete points are mean shares of
corresponding subgroups. Details of the distribution of contributions to global mitigation are provided in Table SM-1 in the
Online Supplementary Material.
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because Brazil qualifies for exemption by responsibility
measured in terms of CO2 emissions but scores (much) higher
on most capabilities indicators. Large differences can be
expected also for other developing countries that qualify for
full exemption by (some) responsibility criteria but that have
at least some of the capabilities required to contribute to
mitigation. Overall, exemption rules are critical determinants
of obligations and costs.
4. Conclusion: outlining a ‘mutual
recognition’ approach
Our analysis shows that the fairness principles of responsi-
bilities and capabilities yield similar results for most actors,
at least in Scenario 1, but not for all. It furthermore showsTable 4 – Operational specifications of norm interpretations giv
costs) for each country.
Actor Lowest obligations/costs
United States R: all GHG emissions, 1990–2010 
European Union C: renewable energy endow. per cap
Japan C: renewable energy endow. per cap
Russia R: CO2 1990–2017, total consump
Brazil R: CO2 emissions per capita (exempt
China R: CO2 emissions per capita, 1971
India R: CO2 emissions per capita (exempt
Note: R indicates responsibilities, C capabilities. Italics mean that this
indicators for this particular actor (by a factor <5 for the ‘lowest’ column
also carbon embodied in international trade.that although most operational interpretations of each
principle correlate positively, no single indicator can
represent all legitimate interpretations of either principle.
These findings have important implications for the role(s)
that norms of distributive fairness can play in the UNFCCC
negotiations. Given the stark asymmetries existing between
rich and poor, the amount of control that major emitters
have over emission cuts, and the UNFCCC system’s limited
capacity to integrate and aggregate divergent preferences
(Keohane and Victor, 2011), search for an integrated
‘fairness-optimizing’ formula may well increase the risk of
deadlock. What the UNFCCC negotiations seem to need as
attention turns towards bottom-up announcements of
voluntary contributions (Kallbekken et al., 2014; Rietig,
2014) is a more ecumenical approach that can help parties
build agreement on diversity and foster positive reciprocity
through cooperative behaviour.ing the lowest and the highest mitigation obligations (and
 Highest obligations/costs
R: CO2 emissions per capita, 1971–2009
ita R: CO2 emissions per capita, 1971–2009
ita C: individual wealth
tion C: renewable energy endow. per capita
ion) C: renewable energy endow. per capita
–2009 R: CO2 total emissions, 1990–2017
ion) R: CO2 1990–2017, total consumption
 score differs substantially from the scores observed for all other
, or a factor >2 for the ‘highest’ column). Total consumption includes
Fig. 3 – Deviations of GDP from BAU in 2030: (a) Scenario 1 and (b) Scenario 2. Note: The vertical lines show the ranges of the
deviations for the distributive schemes of each scenario and the ‘‘X’’s show the simple average of deviations in the 15
cases. The most positive deviations are shown above the lines and the most negative below. Details of the regional
mitigation costs are provided in Table SM-6 in the Online Supplementary Material.
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does so by narrowing the range of legitimate principles and
interpretations in accordance with the guidance provided by
normative theory. In addition, the approach builds on two
principal insights of social science research. One, pioneered by
Simon (1947), says that in dealing with complex problems,
decision-makers usually adopt a technique of (sequential)
satisficing rather than (synoptic) optimizing. Applied to the
UNFCCC negotiations, this insight suggests that fairness
principles and interpretations may best be understood as
filters blocking ‘unfair’ options. The other insight says that
concerns with fairness and legitimacy apply not merely to the
outcome but also to procedure and behaviour (e.g. Rawls,
1971). In fact, a recently published study of international trade
negotiations (Albin and Druckman, 2014, p. 1) finds that ‘[T]he
correlations between procedural justice and effectiveness are
very strong, and significantly stronger than between distribu-
tive justice and effectiveness’. This is an important reminder
that mutual trust and respect must sometimes be grown and
that the process may take years of patient and careful
cultivation. The core of the mutual recognition approach is
a set of behavioural rules that may help parties do so.
The first and most fundamental rule calls upon all parties
to accept a small set of basic fairness principles, and a limited
range of interpretations of each of these principles, as
legitimate premises for an international agreement. ‘Legiti-
mate’ here means broadly consistent (a) with the FrameworkConvention’s CBDR&RC platform, and (b) with the guidance
provided by relevant normative theory, as summarized
in Section 2. Taken together, this set of principles and
interpretations may serve as a common and somewhat elastic
framework for working towards a distribution of commit-
ments that recognizes ‘. . . the simultaneous presence of
multiple valid, and sometimes conflicting ways, of framing a
problem’ (Brugnach and Ingram, 2012, p. 61).
Second, in determining which principles and interpreta-
tions to accept as legitimate, parties apply a standard of
reciprocity. In this context, reciprocity implies (a) acceptance
that any fairness principle – and any interpretation of such a
principle – that a party advocates may legitimately be invoked
by any other party, and (b) recognition of any other principle or
interpretation that a party would likely have supported had it
found itself in circumstances similar to those of the party
invoking that principle or interpretation. According to
requirement (a), anyone claiming, for example, a right to
development must grant the same right to all others, including
previous and future generations. According to (b), parties must
admit that their own conceptions of fairness are to some
extent influenced by self-interest and allow others to be
similarly self-interested. These kinds of reciprocity rules may
be refined by, for example, granting parties the right to claim
exemption from an indicator that yields a particularly
unfavourable outcome, far outside the range defined by other
indicators (see Table 3). Conversely, parties may agree to
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 5 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 – 4 4 43constrain reliance on single indicators that yield exceptionally
positive outcomes. Such rules will likely be controversial but –
if supported by conference presidents, committee chairs, and
external review panels – they can at least call attention to
important questions of reciprocity and help parties acknowl-
edge their own biases.
Third, in assessing alternative conceptions of distributive
fairness, parties recognize that they all operate under feasibility
constraints, political as well as technological and economic.
Only measures that pass all these constraints can be
effectively implemented. Moreover, as stalemate continues,
parties face an evermore pressing dilemma between fairness
and effectiveness: insisting on immediate and ‘perfect’ equity
will almost certainly lead to GHG emissions well above the
threshold IPCC considers prudent to avoid ‘dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system’ (UNFCCC,
Article 2). Mutual recognition of feasibility constraints may
help parties see merits in constructive exploration of agree-
ments involving change in relative contributions over time.
Fourth, since some parties’ scores on capabilities as well as
responsibilities criteria change over time, a dynamic agreement
including provisions for regular updating will have significant
advantages over static arrangements. Whatever its merits at
the time of its invention, the frozen dichotomy between
Annex I countries and the rest of the world is becoming
increasingly inadequate as an expression of present and
future variance in responsibilities, capabilities, and needs.
Finally, we make no claim that the approach outlined above
will always be more effective than a formula approach will be.
Clearly, once agreed, a single formula can provide guidance
that is more precise. Moreover, as the European Union
experience indicates, a formula approach has a fair chance
of being adopted and successfully implemented where (a) the
group of parties is fairly small and homogeneous, (b) the
organization serving this group has high institutional capaci-
ty, (c) the implementation power balance tilts in favour of
enthusiasts, and (d) the problem itself scores low on political-
malignancy scales. Our main arguments are (a) that UNFCCC
negotiations occur in a very different and much more
demanding setting, and (b) that because they increasingly
turn towards individual pledges of emission reduction targets
and measures, a ‘matching’ approach is needed to bring
principles of procedural and distributive fairness to serve as
premises for formulating and assessing pledges. The mutual
recognition approach is designed specifically for such highly
demanding settings where mutual trust and understanding
must be cultivated and confirmed through fair procedures and
cooperative behaviour vis-a`-vis other parties (see Lejano and
Fernandez de Castro, 2014).
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This study uses a multi-sector, multi-regional, recursively
dynamic global computable general equilibrium model GRACE
(Aaheim and Rive, 2005). GRACE stands for the Global
Responses to Anthropogenic Change in the Environment.
The model has been applied to studies on climate impact,
adaptation, mitigation, and related policy analysis (e.g.
Aaheim et al., 2012; Eskeland et al., 2012; Glomsrød et al.,
2013; Rypdal et al., 2007).
This version of GRACE divides the world into 8 regions:
United States, European Union, Japan, Russia, China, India,
Brazil, and the Rest of the World. The regional economy
includes 15 production activities (Table 3, Glomsrød et al.,
2013). The model is calibrated around the GTAP v7 database,
with 2004 as a base year (Badri and Walmsley, 2008).
In a region, the exogenous endowments of productive
resources (i.e. labour, capital, and natural resources) are fully
used for production in a year. Labour can flow freely from one
activity to another, whereas capital and natural resources are
activity-specific. Producers pursue profit maximization and
consumers pursue utility maximization. Bilateral trade allows
substitution among regional contributions. Regional income
includes the remuneration for productive resources and taxes.
Savings as a fixed share of income are used for investments
such that the changes in rates of return on capital are
equalized for all regions. The new capital formed from the
investment and capital depreciation in a region is allocated to
activities such that their rates of return are equalized. The
capital existing at the beginning of the previous year is
activity-specific.
Economic growth is mainly driven by savings and invest-
ments, but is also determined by population growth, change in
the availability of natural resources, and technological
change. The regional rates of technological change are the
same for all simulation cases.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
envsci.2015.03.009.
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